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BANKRUPTCY SECTION 363(b) SALES: 
MARKET TEST PROCEDURES AND 
HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY OF EXPEDITED 
SALES MAY PREVENT ABUSES AND 
SAFEGUARD CREDITORS WITHOUT 
LIMITING THE POWER OF THE COURTS 
INTRODUCTION 
On April 30, 2009, Chrysler LLC filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
protection after failing to reach an agreement with lenders to restructure its 
debt.1 President Barack H. Obama promised a quick bankruptcy process, 
with one senior official predicting that the process could be completed 
within thirty to sixty days.2 The government’s promises were fulfilled on 
May 31, 2009, when Southern District of New York Bankruptcy Court 
Judge Arthur Gonzalez issued a decision approving a sale of the 
corporation’s main business assets to a newly formed entity, “New 
Chrysler.”3 After an expedited appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
issued a bench decision affirming the Bankruptcy Court on June 5, 2009, 
and released a full written decision two months later.4 Later that year, 
Chrysler’s “Big Three”5 brother, General Motors, Corp., filed for Chapter 
11.6 Similar to Chrysler, General Motor’s path through bankruptcy took 
approximately one month.7 As was the case in Chrysler,8 the debtor in 
General Motors, with the approval and order of the Court, used Bankruptcy 
Code (the Code) § 363(b)9 to sell the General Motors assets to a new entity, 
“New General Motors.”10 Further, in both cases, the federal government 
was highly involved, with the Treasury Department (Treasury) providing 
financing for the bankruptcies and the government—along with the United 
Auto Workers Union—acquiring ownership of a large portion of the new 
entities.11 
                                                                                                                                          
 1. See In re Chrysler LLC (Chrysler I), 405 B.R. 84, 87–88 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 2. Chris Isidore, Chrysler Files For Bankruptcy, CNNMONEY.com, May 1, 2009, 
http://money.cnn.com/2009/04/30/news/companies/chrysler_bankruptcy/index.html. 
 3. In re Chrysler I, 405 B.R. at 84–92, 113. 
 4. In re Chrysler LLC (Chrysler II), 576 F.3d 108, 109, 127 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 5. The “Big Three” refers to the three major American automotive companies: General 
Motors, Ford, and Chrysler. 
 6. In re General Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 479 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“On June 1, 2009 
. . . GM filed its chapter 11 petition in this court.”). 
 7. See id. at 520 (approving the 363(b) sale of the assets of General Motors to a purchaser 
“New GM” on Sunday, July 5, 2009). 
 8. See Chrysler I, 405 B.R. at 87. 
 9. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (2006); discussion infra Part II. 
 10. In re General Motors, 407 B.R. at 473. 
 11. Mike Ramsey & Lizzie O’Leary, Fiat Said to Buy Chrysler Assets Today to Form New 
Automaker, BLOOMBERG.COM, June 10, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=news 
archive&sid=aAB9jCmPBUQU (“Chrysler Group LLC, will be owned 20 percent by Turin, Italy-
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In all likelihood, neither General Motors nor Chrysler could have 
survived a long, drawn-out bankruptcy process.12 Some commentators 
argue the short processes and use of § 363(b) sales were vital to prevent the 
companies’ collapse and a resulting loss of the production, jobs, and 
stability that they provide.13 However, even if the quick sale of the two auto 
giants was the correct and legal course of action, questions remain as to 
whether the Chrysler and General Motors cases will serve as precedent for 
a more liberal use of these expedited sales procedures.14 Further, if the use 
of § 363(b) sales does increase, what consequences await? And if these 
consequences are negative or undesirable, can anything be done to mitigate 
them while preserving the flexibility and benefits the use of such sales 
provides bankruptcy judges and filers alike? 
Despite the many conveniences and benefits of § 363(b) sales, 
additional procedural safeguards should be put in place to prevent abuses 
from occurring. This note proposes a robust market test for § 363(b) sales 
that requires: 1) disclosure of sales terms; 2) adequate time for market 
                                                                                                                                          
based Fiat, 9.85 percent by the U.S., 2.46 percent by Canada and 67.69 percent by a United Auto 
Workers union retiree health care trust fund. The U.S. and Canadian governments financed the 
sale with $2 billion.”); Emily Chasan & Phil Wahba, GM Asks for Bankruptcy Sale in 30 Days, 
REUTERS, June 1, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/businessNews/idUSTRE 
5507X420090601 (“Under a government-backed restructuring plan, the Obama administration 
would take a 60 percent stake in the newly-formed company made up of GM’s most profitable 
assets. The UAW would have a 17.5 percent stake, the Canadian government would own about 12 
percent and GM bondholders would receive about 10 percent.”). 
 12. See generally Stephen J. Lubben, No Big Deal: The GM and Chrysler Cases in Context, 83 
AM. BANKR. L.J. 531, 544 (2009) (noting that “liquidating a company the size of Chrysler would 
have cost millions of dollars”). The U.S. Treasury and Canadian government officials also wanted 
an “expedited” process to “preserve the value of the business, restore consumer confidences, and 
avoid the costs of a lengthy chapter 11 process.” Id. at 536–37. 
 13. See A. Joseph Warburton, Understanding the Bankruptcies of Chrysler and General 
Motors: a Primer, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 531, 567–68 (2010) (discussing the rapid erosion of 
assets and “going concern value” of Chrysler LLC in the Chrysler case). As of early 2009, 
“General Motors employed approximately 235,000 employees worldwide” and had assets of $82 
billion. In re General Motors, 407 B.R. at 475. Chrysler employed approximately 55,000 
employees and had revenue of nearly $50 billion for the year prior to its bankruptcy petition. In re 
Chrysler LLC (Chrysler I), 405 B.R. 84, 88–89 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 14. Multiple commentators have questioned the state of bankruptcy law after General Motors 
and Chrysler. See, e.g., Barry E. Adler, A Reassessment of Bankruptcy Reorganization After 
Chrysler and General Motors, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 305, 305 (2010). 
The recent bankruptcy cases of Chrysler and General Motors were successful in that 
they quickly removed assets from the burden of unmanageable debt amidst a global 
recession, but the price of this achievement was unnecessarily high because the cases 
established or buttressed precedent for the disregard of creditor rights. As a result, the 
automaker bankruptcies may usher in a period where the threat of insolvency will 
increase the cost of capital in an economy where affordable credit is sorely needed. 
Id.; Robert M. Fishman & Gordon E. Gouveia, What's Driving Section 363 Sales After Chrysler 
and General Motors?, 19 NORTON. J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 4, Art. 2 (2010) (“Do the Chrysler and 
General Motors cases represent a new paradigm in which preserving going concern value and jobs 
take precedence over the protections that Chapter 11 has traditionally afforded to creditors?”) 
(citations omitted). 
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players to bid on the asset; and 3) centralized review of competing bids. 
Additionally, where “time is of the essence” and a market test is either 
impossible or impractical, heightened judicial review should substitute for 
such a test. Part I of this note provides the history of pre-confirmation asset 
sales in bankruptcy proceedings. Part II compares § 363(b) sales with 
bankruptcy reorganization plan confirmations and analyzes the benefits and 
detriments of each. Part III proposes a robust market test procedure to be 
implemented in § 363(b) sales and heightened scrutiny for “time is of the 
essence” sales, where a robust market test is impossible. The note concludes 
by explaining the significance and drawbacks of this proposal and what 
future problems may arise in § 363(b) sales. 
I. HISTORY OF THE BANKRUPTCY PRE-CONFIRMATION 
ASSET SALE 
Section 363(b), used in both Chrysler and General Motors, provides a 
means by which a bankruptcy judge can order a company to sell assets 
before a bankruptcy plan confirmation is reached.15 The procedure involves 
a showing of cause for the sale and courts allow creditors the opportunity to 
object.16 The use of these pre-confirmation sales is expressly provided for in 
11 U.S.C. § 363(b), enacted in 1978.17 The provisions of this section of the 
Code apply equally to a debtor in possession (DIP or debtor) as they do to a 
trustee.18 Additionally, the “other than in the ordinary course of business” 
clause has been read broadly to allow sales of entire business entities.19 
Section 363(b) sales have been used in some of the largest and most 
well-known bankruptcies, including those of Enron and the two recent 
                                                                                                                                          
 15. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (2006). 
 16. Id. 
 17. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) states the following: 
(b)(1) The trustee, after notice and a hearing, may use, sell, or lease, other than in the 
ordinary course of business, property of the estate, . . . 
(B) after appointment of a consumer privacy ombudsman in accordance with 
section 332, and after notice and a hearing, the court approves such sale or 
such lease— 
(i) giving due consideration to the facts, circumstances, and conditions of  
such sale or such lease; and 
(ii) finding that no showing was made that such sale or such lease would 
violate applicable nonbankruptcy law. 
Id. 
 18. For the purposes of § 363, the debtor in possession enjoys the same rights and benefits 
under the Code as those prescribed to the trustee. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 363, 1107, 1108 (2006). 
 19. See, e.g., In re General Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 489–90 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009); In re 
Chrysler LLC (Chrysler I), 405 B.R. 84, 94 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009); In re Torch Offshore, Inc., 
327 B.R. 254 (E.D. La 2005). 
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automotive manufacturer bankruptcies.20 Academic appraisal of § 363(b) 
sales has varied, with some advocating for their use as a model to which all 
large bankruptcies should aspire,21 while others have criticized the use of 
such sales, claiming that they subvert the bankruptcy system and are ripe 
for abuse.22 
Expedited pre-confirmation sales procedures have a long history in 
American bankruptcy law, with statutory authority for such sales enacted as 
early as 1867.23 The evolution of § 363(b) sales since that time provides 
meaningful insight into the drafters’ purpose and intent in crafting the 
procedures for these sales. 
A. PRE-CONFIRMATION SALE OF ASSETS IN 
BANKRUPTCY PRIOR TO THE 1978 BANKRUPTCY CODE 
The Bankruptcy Act of 1867 provided that the court may order the sale 
of the estate of the debtor if it finds that it “is of a perishable nature, or 
liable to deteriorate in value . . . .”24 The Second Circuit, in 1913, held that 
the concept of “perishable” was not only limited to the physical nature of 
the object but also to the price of the object.25 The Ninth Circuit, using as a 
standard for determining the validity of a sale the deterioration of monetary 
value as well as physical deterioration, reached the same result twenty years 
later in Hill v. Douglas, upholding the sale of road-making equipment to 
prevent repossession.26 
                                                                                                                                          
 20. See, e.g., Chrysler I, 405 B.R. at 113, In re General Motors, 407 B.R. at 520, In re Enron 
Corp., 291 B.R. 39, 40 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); see also The 10 Largest U.S. Bankruptcies, 
CNNMONEY.COM, http://money.cnn.com/galleries/2009/fortune/0905/gallery.largest_bankrup 
tcies.fortune/index.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2010). 
 21. See, e.g., Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y. Waisman, Does Chapter 11 Reorganization Remain 
a Viable Option for Distressed Businesses for the Twenty-First Century?, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 153 
(2004); Bryant P. Lee, Note, Chapter 18? Imagining Future Uses of 11 U.S.C. § 363 to 
Accomplish Chapter 7 Liquidation Goals in Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 2009 COLUM. BUS. L. 
REV. 520. 
 22. E.g., Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Bankruptcy Fire Sales, 106 MICH. L. REV. 
1, 13 (2007); Chad P. Pugatch, Craig A. Pugatch & Travis Vaughan, The Lost Art of Chapter 11 
Reorganization, 19 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 39, 58 (2008); Craig A. Sloane, The Sub Rosa Plan 
of Reorganization: Side-Stepping Creditor Protections in Chapter 11, 16 BANKR. DEV. J 37, 63 
(1999); Elizabeth B. Rose, Note, Chocolate, Flowers, and § 363(b): The Opportunity for 
Sweetheart Deals Without Chapter 11 Protections, 23 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 249, 249 (2006) 
(citing Administration of Large Business Bankruptcy Reorganizations: Has Competition for Big 
Cases Corrupted the Bankruptcy System?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and 
Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 15 (2004) (statement of Lynn M. 
LoPucki)). 
 23. See Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517, 528 (1867). 
 24. Id. 
 25. In re Pedlow, 209 F. 841, 842 (2d Cir. 1913). 
 26. Hill v. Douglass, 78 F.2d 851, 854 (9th Cir. 1935). 
It will be conceded that road-making equipment is not within the ordinary concept of 
perishable property. Yet the courts have been liberal in their construction of this term 
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In the Chandler Act of 1938 (the Chandler Act), the immediate 
precursor to the current Code, § 116(3) provided that a sale could be 
ordered “upon cause shown.”27 This standard was generally read as an 
extension of the “perishable” concept that existed prior to the Chandler Act 
and pre-confirmation sales persisted as the exceptional remedy.28 The 
circuit courts split in their approach to the validity of sales pursuant to § 
116(3) of the Chandler Act.29 The Second Circuit took a broad view of the 
statute and, in Frank v. Drinc-O-Matic, Inc., gave the bankruptcy judge 
wide discretion in ordering such sales by adopting an abuse of discretion 
standard.30 In subsequent cases, the court found that varying conditions 
such as inability of a debtor to redeem property, failure to pass a plan of 
reorganization, and the wasting away of an asset were appropriate 
conditions for the ordering of a pre-confirmation sale.31 
Not all circuits liberally interpreted the Chandler Act.32 The Third 
Circuit, in In re Solar Mfg. Corp., limited the use of § 116(3) procedures to 
“emergency” situations, involving an “imminent” loss of assets.33 That 
reasoning was even adopted, albeit for only a short period of time, by the 
Second Circuit in In re Pure Penn Petroleum Co., where the court required 
a showing of imminent loss to effectuate a sale.34 However, from the 1950s 
                                                                                                                                          
and have held it to include not only that which may deteriorate physically, but that 
which is liable to deteriorate in price and value. 
Id. (citing In re Pedlow, 209 F. 841 (2d Cir. 1913); In re Inter-City Trust, 295 F. 495, 497 (9th 
Cir. 1924)). 
 27. See In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d 1063, 1067–68 (2d Cir. 1983) (citing the Chandler Act of 
1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 883 (1938)). 
 28. See id. at 1066–67. 
 29. Compare In re Sire Plan Inc., 332 F.2d 497, 499 (2d Cir. 1964) (approving a sale where 
the hotel, at the time a skeletal frame, was wasting away), In re Marathon Foundry and Machine 
Co., 228 F.2d 594, 598 (7th Cir. 1955) (approving the sale of stock where trustee had insufficient 
assets to redeem the stock), and Frank v. Drinc-O-Matic, 136 F.2d 906, 906 (2d Cir. 1943) 
(approving sale of vending machines where machines were encumbered by liens and trustee had 
insufficient funds to redeem machines), with In re Solar Mfg. Corp., 176 F.2d 493, 494 (3d Cir. 
1949) (denying the sale of business despite record losses and deterioration of real estate values 
because the sale did not meet “emergency” requirements). 
 30. See Frank, 136 F.2d at 906. 
 31. See In re Equity Funding Corp. of America, 492 F.2d 793, 794 (9th Cir. 1974) (“[T]he 
market value of Liberty was likely to deteriorate in the near future . . . .”); In re Sire, 332 F.2d at 
499 (“[T]he Trustees’ evidence demonstrated at hearing [that] the partially constructed building is 
a ‘wasting asset.’”); In re Marathon, 228 F.2d at 594 (“The trustees had not sufficient funds with 
which to redeem the pledged stock.”); Frank, 136 F.2d at 906 (“The trustee had no funds with 
which to redeem the machines, and after six months no plan of reorganization had been 
proposed.”). 
 32. See, e.g., Solar Mfg., 176 F.2d at 494–95. 
 33. Id. 
 34. In re Pure Penn Petroleum Co., 188 F.2d 851, 854 (2d Cir. 1951) (“The debtor here, 
therefore, was obliged to allege and had the burden of proving the existence of an emergency 
involving imminent danger of loss of the assets if they were not promptly sold.”). The emergency 
requirement was then replaced only thirteen years later by the “best interest” test. In re Sire, 332 
F.2d at 497. 
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on, courts began to uphold more sales in which the sale was justified as in 
the “best interest of the [] estate”;35 circumstances that warranted the order 
of a sale included a likely fall in market value, heavy interest charges and 
deteriorating stock value.36 
Despite the removal of the “perishability” term from the Bankruptcy 
Act, the circumstances of the above cases indicated that the “perishability” 
standard remained in place after the adoption of the Chandler Act, whether 
through the “emergency” or “best interest of the estate” standards.37 
B. 1978 BANKRUPTCY CODE, SECTION 363(b) SALES 
PROCEDURES 
The current Bankruptcy Code was enacted in 1978 and became 
effective for all cases filed after October 1, 1979.38 The Code amended and 
replaced the Bankruptcy Act.39 The Code provided a bankruptcy judge with 
the power to order a sale of the debtor’s assets under §§ 363(b) and 363(f).40 
Section 363(b) gave statutory strength to the use of such sales without the 
“perishable” standard of the 1867 act or the “upon cause shown” standard 
of the Chandler Act, requiring only “notice and a hearing” to effectuate a 
sale.41 This language, which was more relaxed than the prior enactments, 
provided little guidance as to the circumstances under which a sale may be 
approved, or what the procedural safeguards of “notice and a hearing” 
provided for creditors opposed to the sale actually required.42 
C. IN RE WHITE MOTOR CREDIT CORP. AND THE 
“EMERGENCY” DOCTRINE 
In In re White Motor Credit Corp., the bankruptcy court interpreted the 
newly promulgated Code43 as not authorizing a “sale of all or substantially 
all assets of the estate.”44 However, the court “left the [former] ‘emergency’ 
                                                                                                                                          
 35. See, e.g., In re Equity Funding, 492 F.2d at 794 (“[T]he proposed sale would be in the best 
interest of the bankrupt estate. Based upon these findings, which are not clearly erroneous, the 
trial court could properly conclude that there was ‘cause shown’ for the approval pursuant to 11 
U.S.C. § 516(3).”); Frank, 136 F.2d at 906 (approving sales after concluding that it was “desirable 
for debtor”). 
 36. See In re Sire, 332 F.2d at 499 (wasting asset likely to deteriorate in value); In re Equity 
Funding, 492 F.2d at 794 (declining value of stock held by trustee); In re Marathon, 228 F.2d at 
598–99 (discussing how interest charges prevented debtor from being able to redeem stock). 
 37. In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d 1063, 1069 (2d Cir. 1983). 
 38. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended 
at 11 U.S.C.). 
 39. See id. 
 40. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(b), (f) (2006). 
 41. Id. 
 42. See, e.g., In re Lionel, 722 F.2d at 1069; In re Braniff Airways, Inc., 700 F.2d 935, 940 
(5th Cir. 1983). 
 43. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(b). 
 44. In re White Motor Credit Corp., 14 B.R. 584, 590 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981). 
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exception45 in tact . . . .”46 The court concluded that an imminent loss of $40 
million in the value of assets of the estate provided the necessary showing 
of an “emergency” to approve a sale of the assets.47 This decision appeared 
to severely limit courts’ ability to order pre-confirmation sales and to 
undermine the broad language of the Code.48 However, subsequent opinions 
would expand and more clearly define the extent to which bankruptcy 
courts could approve pre-confirmation sales.49 
D. IN RE LIONEL CORP. AND THE “GOOD BUSINESS 
REASON” STANDARD 
Despite the absence of guiding language in § 363(b), the Second 
Circuit, in In re Lionel Corp., found that the Code’s legislative history 
suggested that the framers intended to require a trustee or debtor to justify 
the use of a pre-confirmation sale.50 However, the court stated that the 
“perishability” and “emergency” standards that were formerly employed 
were no longer required.51 The court held that to properly order a sale 
pursuant to § 363(b), a “good business reason” for such an order must be 
provided before the confirmation of a plan of reorganization.52 The court 
listed the following factors as persuasive in finding a business justification 
for the sale of assets: 
[T]he proportionate value of the asset to the estate as a whole, the amount 
of elapsed time since the filing, the likelihood that a plan of reorganization 
will be proposed and confirmed in the near future, the effect of the 
proposed disposition on future plans of reorganization, the proceeds to be 
obtained from the disposition vis-a-vis any appraisals of the property, 
which of the alternatives of use, sale or lease the proposal envisions and, 
most importantly perhaps, whether the asset is increasing or decreasing in 
value.53  
The court found that the underlying asset in the case—stock owned by 
the corporation—was not wasting, nor was there an “emergency” requiring 
its sale.54 The panel held the sale improper, even though it applied the 
                                                                                                                                          
 45. See discussion supra Part I.A. 
 46. See In re White Motor, 14 B.R. at 590. 
 47. See id. 
 48. See generally In re White Motor, 14 B.R. 584; see also 11 U.S.C. § 363(b). 
 49. See In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d 1063, 1071 (2d Cir. 1983); In re Braniff Airways, Inc., 
700 F.2d 935, 940 (5th Cir. 1983). 
 50. See In re Lionel, 722 F.2d at 1069 (“the statute requires notice and a hearing, and these 
procedural safeguards would be meaningless absent a further requirement that reasons be given 
for whatever determination is made . . . .”). 
 51. See id. 
 52. Id. at 1071. 
 53. Id. 
 54. See id. at 1071–72. 
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highly deferential abuse of discretion standard.55 The court continued that 
although it sympathized with the bankruptcy court’s desire to expedite the 
proceedings, “‘[t]he need for expedition, however, is not a justification for 
abandoning proper standards.’”56 Although the Lionel court found no 
business justification in the case, the decision’s central holding—that a 
debtor or trustee attempting to use a § 363(b) sale must provide business 
justification for the sale57—has provided precedential support for a 
broadening of the bankruptcy courts’ power to authorize such sales.58 Lionel 
is currently the standard under which proposed § 363(b) sales are judged. 
In the Chrysler bankruptcy, the court justified the § 363(b) sale by 
finding that Chrysler was an asset wasting away in bankruptcy.59 Chrysler 
was shutting down factories and required immense funding merely to 
sustain operations, and Fiat—the only available purchaser for Chrysler—
insisted that the sale be completed within a certain period of time.60 In 
General Motors, the fact that the government predicated its financing on the 
consummation of a quick § 363(b) sale provided a sufficiently “good 
business reason” to justify the sale.61 This type of “time is of the essence” 
justification may be invoked by a debtor requesting that the court approve a 
sale before the purchaser is able to pull out of the agreement.62 
                                                                                                                                          
 55. See id. 
 56. Id. at 1071 (quoting Protective Comm. for Indep. Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. 
v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 450 (1968)).   57. Id. 
 58. See, e.g., In re General Motors, 407 B.R. 463 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009); In re Chrysler LLC 
(Chrysler I), 405 B.R. 84 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009); In re Global Crossing Ltd., 295 B.R. 726 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003); In re Medical Software Solutions, 286 B.R. 431 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 59. See Chrysler I, 405 B.R. at 96. 
 60. See id. at 96–97. 
  The Governmental Entities, the funding sources for the Fiat Transaction, have 
emphasized that the financing offered is contingent upon a sale closing quickly. 
Moreover, if a sale has not closed by June 15th, Fiat could withdraw its commitment. 
Thus, the Debtors were confronted with either (a) a potential liquidation of their assets 
which would result in closing of plants and layoffs, impacting suppliers, dealers, 
workers and retirees, or (b) a government-backed purchase of the sale of their assets 
which allowed the purchaser to negotiate terms with suppliers, vendors, dealerships and 
workers to satisfy whatever obligations were owed to these constituencies. 
Id. 
 61. See In re General Motors, 407 B.R. at 480. 
  To facilitate the process, the U.S. Treasury and the governments of Canada and 
Ontario (through their Export Development Canada (‘EDC’)) agreed to provide DIP 
financing for GM through the chapter 11 process. But they would provide the DIP 
financing only if the sale of the purchased assets occurred on an expedited basis. 
Id. (emphasis in original). 
 62. See Michael J. de la Merced, U.S. Court of Appeals Upholds Chrysler Sale to Fiat, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 6, 2009, at B2 (“Lawyers for Chrysler and the government argued that the sale to Fiat 
needed to be completed as quickly as possible to preserve its viability and to save thousands of 
jobs. Fiat can walk away if no agreement is struck by June 15.”). 
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E. IN RE BRANIFF AIRWAYS, INC. AND THE SUB ROSA 
OBJECTION 
Decided the same year as Lionel, In re Braniff provided that a § 363(b) 
sale that distributes assets among creditors was inappropriate and 
constituted a sub rosa plan that attempted to bypass the protections of 
Chapter 11 plan confirmation proceedings.63 In Braniff, the debtor 
attempted to sell its property—which included airplane leases, equipment, 
terminal leases, airport slots, and other assets—to a new entity, PSA,64 in 
exchange for right to travel on PSA that would be allocated to former 
creditors, employees, and shareholders.65 Of particular importance, the 
Braniff court held that a release of claims or payment of prepetition debts is 
not a “‘use, sale or lease’ and is not authorized by § 363(b).”66 The court did 
state that “certain adjustments in the rights of creditors” are permitted in § 
363(e) “to assure ‘adequate protection’” of the interests of secured 
creditors.67 The court went on to hold that “[i]n any future attempts to 
specify the terms whereby a reorganization plan is to be adopted, the parties 
and the district court must scale the hurdles erected in Chapter 11.”68 
This ban on sub rosa plans has been extended from § 363(b) sales to 
settlement agreements in which assets of the estate are distributed.69 In In re 
Iridium, the Second Circuit held that a settlement in the course of the 
bankruptcy proceeding was inappropriate because it distributed assets to 
prepetition creditors as part of the agreement.70 The court found that the 
settlement allowed the negotiating parties to sidestep the “fair and 
equitable” standard as well as the “absolute priority rule” of bankruptcy 
plan confirmations.71 Although the Iridium court did not label the 
settlement as a sub rosa plan, it stated that a settlement cannot be offered to 
avoid the “strictures of the Bankruptcy Code.”72 
                                                                                                                                          
 63. See In re Braniff Airways, Inc., 700 F.2d 935, 940 (5th Cir. 1983) (“The debtor and the 
Bankruptcy Court should not be able to short circuit the requirements of Chapter 11 for 
confirmation of a reorganization plan by establishing the terms of the plan sub rosa in connection 
with a sale of assets.”) (emphasis in the original). Many courts find that the use of such tools is 
improper. See In re Westpoint Stevens Inc., 333 B.R. 30, 51–52 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 64. See In re Braniff, 700 F.2d at 939. The PSA was an entity formed as part of the Braniff 
Bankruptcy that took possession of the Braniff Airway’s assets in exchange for payoff of debts 
and allocation of rights to travel on the new airline. See id. 
 65. Id. at 939–40. 
 66. See id. at 940. 
 67. Id. at 940 n.2. (“[The court] is aware that the Code provides for certain adjustments 
pursuant to a valid § 363 transaction in order to provide ‘adequate protection’ to secured 
creditors.”) (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 361; 363(e) (1982)). 
 68. Id. at 940 (listing the applicable hurdles as “disclosure requirements” in 11 U.S.C. § 1125, 
“voting” in 11 U.S.C. § 1126, “best interest of creditors test” in 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7), and the 
“absolute priority rule” in 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)). 
 69. See In re Iridium Operating LLC, 478 F.3d 452 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 70. See id. at 464. 
 71. Id. at 462–65. 
 72. Id. at 464. 
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In both the General Motors and Chrysler bankruptcies, payouts to 
prepetition creditors were part of the § 363(b) sales.73 In both cases, the 
unions received significant shares of the “new” corporations without 
providing new capital input.74 These actions were justified in both cases 
because the workforce was necessary for the businesses to succeed and the 
unions would provide significant value to the new corporations.75 However, 
the payouts to the former pension funds in Chrysler and General Motors, 
and the shares of the new enterprises given before other creditors were paid 
out in both cases,76 could be interpreted as hallmarks of a sub rosa plan, in 
which the unions, capable of scuttling the new businesses, gained 
preferential treatment.77 In fact, in the Chrysler case, this was one basis 
upon which the Indiana pension fund creditors challenged the propriety of 
the sale.78 
                                                                                                                                          
 73. See In re General Motors, 407 B.R. 463, 484 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (discussing the fact 
that as part of § 363 sale, “New GM” infused capital into retirement fund of union auto workers); 
In re Chrysler LLC (Chrysler I), 405 B.R. 84, 92 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (discussing how the 
U.S. government provided funding for workers’ pension fund through infusion of capital and 
equity in reorganized company). 
 74. See In re General Motors, 407 B.R. at 497–98; Chrysler I, 405 B.R. at 99–100. 
 75. See Adler, supra note 14, at 310 (“[T]he payment to VEBA was . . . a prospective expense 
that assured the company a needed supply of UAW workers, with the union thus portrayed as a 
critical vendor of labor.”). 
 76. See id. 
[In Chrysler,] the purchaser, “New Chrysler”—an affiliation of Fiat, the U.S. and 
Canadian governments, and the United Auto Workers (“UAW”)—took the assets 
subject to specified liabilities and interests. More specifically, New Chrysler assumed 
about $4.5 billion of Chrysler's obligations to, and distributed 55% of its equity to, the 
UAW's voluntary beneficiary employee association (“VEBA”) in satisfaction of old 
Chrysler's approximately $10 billion unsecured obligation to the VEBA (which is a 
retired workers benefit fund) . . . .  
Id. at 306. 
In General Motors' case, the purchaser, “New GM,” owned largely by the United States 
Treasury, agreed to satisfy General Motors' approximately $20 billion pre-bankruptcy 
obligation to the VEBA with a new $2.5 billion note as well as $6.5 billion of the new 
entity's preferred stock, 17.5% of its common stock, and a warrant to purchase up to an 
additional 2.5% of the equity; depending on the success of New GM, the VEBA claim 
could be paid in full. As in Chrysler, the sale was to take place quickly, within weeks, 
and the sale procedures required that, absent special exemption, any bidder who wished 
to compete with government-financed entity was to assume liabilities to the UAW as a 
condition of the purchase. 
Id. at 312. 
 77. See id. at 313–15 (sale of underlying assets and distribution to unions deprived creditors of 
the protections that they enjoy in a traditional reorganization). 
 78. See Chrysler I, 405 B.R. at 97–100. 
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II. SECTION 363(b) COMPARED TO BANKRUPTCY PLAN 
CONFIRMATION 
A. BANKRUPTCY PLAN CONFIRMATIONS 
A Chapter 11 plan confirmation is a relatively democratic process, 
requiring a debtor to propose a reorganization/distribution plan and work 
with creditors to obtain their willing approval.79 Sales of the entire business 
or sales of major business units may be part of the proposed plan.80 The 
debtor has a period of exclusivity during which it alone may propose plans 
to the creditors,81 and this period may be extended by petition to the trial 
judge.82 During the plan confirmation period, the debtor may obtain exit 
financing83 or an alternative to financing,84 divide creditors into classes,85 
propose a viable post-bankruptcy business organization,86 and endeavor to 
achieve consensus among creditors to support the plan.87 Through this 
process, the debtor attempts to propose a plan that will satisfy the creditors 
while providing the emerging business with an opportunity for a healthy 
start.88 
One path through which a plan may be confirmed is by having a 
majority—defined as greater than half in number and two thirds in value of 
all classes—approve it.89 The debtor is required to submit extensive 
                                                                                                                                          
 79. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (2006). 
 80. Id. § 1129(a)(11) (“Confirmation of the plan is not likely to be followed by the liquidation, 
or the need for further financial reorganization, of the debtor or any successor to the debtor under 
the plan, unless such liquidation or reorganization is proposed in the plan.”). 
 81. Id. § 1121(b) (“Except as otherwise provided in this section, only the debtor may file a 
plan until after 120 days after the date of the order for relief under this chapter.”). 
 82. Id. § 1121(d)(1) (“[O]n request of a party in interest made within the respective periods 
specified in subsections (b) and (c) of this section and after notice and a hearing, the court may for 
cause reduce or increase the 120-day period or the 180-day period referred to in this section.”). 
 83. See id. § 1129(a)(11) (requiring the reorganization to be viable, which in turn requires that 
a reorganizing business in need of capital secure financing in order to have the plan confirmed). 
 84. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. A debtor may thus propose a sale of the 
business entity as part of the reorganization, eliminating the need for further financing. See supra 
note 80 and accompanying text. 
 85. 11 U.S.C. § 1122 (2006). 
 86. Id. § 1129(a)(11). 
 87. Id. § 1129(a). 
 88. Williams v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 236 U.S. 549, 555 (1915). 
  It is the purpose of the bankrupt act to convert the assets of the bankrupt into cash for 
distribution among creditors, and then to relieve the honest debtor from the weight of 
oppressive indebtedness, and permit him to start afresh free from the obligations and 
responsibilities consequent upon business misfortunes. 
Id. 
 89. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c) (2006). Classes are defined by the debtor in the plan proposal. See id. 
§ 1122. However, creditors may object to these classifications if they are not related to business 
differences among the creditors. See, e.g., In re Briscoe Enterprises, Ltd., 994 F.2d 1160, 1166–67 
(5th Cir. 1991). Differentiation among creditors has been held appropriate based on how the 
claims were incurred, the ongoing business relationships between the creditors, and the post-
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documentation about the business, its valuation, and its prospects to the 
creditors before a vote is taken on the plan.90 
If the debtor is unable to achieve a consensual plan, it may force a 
“cramdown” plan confirmation.91 A cramdown must meet all the 
requirements of a consensual plan—absent the agreement of all classes— 
and at least one impaired class must consent to the plan.92 Further, the plan 
must be “fair and equitable”93 and abide by the “absolute priority rule.”94 
The “fair and equitable” and “absolute priority rule” standards require that 
the plan pay secured creditors for the full value of their collateral and 
market interest before unsecured creditors receive any value.95 Unsecured 
creditors, generally, must also be paid in full before equity holders receive 
anything.96 These requirements assure that equity holders will receive no 
value unless the higher priority credit classes are paid in full.97  
                                                                                                                                          
confirmation relationships between the creditors. See, e.g., id. at 1167 (concluding that separation 
of unsecured claims is permitted for a “good business reason”). 
 90. See 11 U.S.C. § 1125 (2006); see also In re Malek, 35 B.R. 443 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983) 
(outlining the requirements of adequate disclosure as part of a plan confirmation including 
“financial information,” “liquidation analysis,” and “transactions with insiders”). 
 91. See, e.g., In re Briscoe, 994 F.2d at 1168–70 (describing a “cramdown” as a plan 
confirmation under 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) where a plan is ordered despite a lack of approval by all 
impaired classes). 
 92. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10) (2006) (“If a class of claims is impaired under the plan, at least 
one class of claims that is impaired under the plan has accepted the plan, determined without 
including any acceptance of the plan by any insider.”). 
 93. Id. § 1129(b)(1). 
[T]he court, on request of the proponent of the plan, shall confirm the plan 
notwithstanding the requirements of such paragraph if the plan does not discriminate 
unfairly, and is fair and equitable, with respect to each class of claims or interests that is 
impaired under, and has not accepted, the plan. 
Id. 
 94. Id. § 1129(b)(2)(A)–(C). 
 95. See id. 
 96. Id. § 1129(b)(2)(B). 
 97. See Peter C.L. Roth, Comment, Bankruptcy Law—The Absolute Priority Rule 
Reasserted—No Equity Participation Without Tangible Capital Contribution, 23 SUFFOLK U. L. 
REV. 857, 861 (1989) (citing Northern Pac. R.R., v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 501–04 (1913) (“One of 
the original purposes of the [absolute priority] rule was to prevent senior secured creditors from 
entering into collusive arrangements with friendly management to squeeze out the unsecured 
debt.”)). However, there remains a way for “old equity” to become “new equity”: an old equity 
holder may give an infusion of new capital and receive a payout less than or equal to that value in 
equity in the reorganized business. See Bank of America Nat’l Trust and Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. 
LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 434, 453–54 (1999) (“A truly full value transaction, on the other 
hand, would pose no threat to the bankruptcy estate not posed by any reorganization, provided of 
course that the contribution be in cash or be realizable money’s worth . . . .”). However, strong 
limitations have been placed on this “new equity” exception including that the new ownership 
cannot be “on account of” the antecedent debt. See id. at 451–53. Also, new capital, and not a 
promise to work, must be infused into the business. Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 
U.S. 197, 203–05 (1988) (holding that debtor farmer’s promise to work on farm and provide 
“labor, experience, and expertise” in exchange for equity in reorganized entity was inappropriate). 
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Regardless of whether a plan’s confirmation is consensual or a 
cramdown, any non-consenting creditor may object that the plan is either 
not in her best interest98 or is unfeasible.99 For a plan to be in her “best 
interest,” the creditor must receive at least as much as she would have in a 
Chapter 7 liquidation.100 For example, if a fully secured creditor objects, she 
must receive the full value of her claim with market interest rates applied. 
Second, for a plan to be feasible, its proponent must show that the business 
will remain viable and will not be liquidated shortly after confirmation—
unless that is part of the plan.101 The proponent must show this with 
reasonable likelihood, though it need not be a certainty;102 however, 
inadequate capitalization, and lack of a viable business plan are grounds 
upon which a plan may be rejected as unfeasible.103  
These elements demonstrate that the plan confirmation process gives a 
much greater level of participation and protection to creditors than does a § 
363(b) sale.104 Even though both processes will likely involve negotiations 
between the debtor and creditors—and a resolution may be achieved over 
the objections of certain creditors—the plan confirmation process provides 
many avenues for a creditor to object and encourages consensus among 
parties.105 Although having a plan confirmation does not ensure absolutely 
against abuse or self-dealing, the definitive nature of the “absolute priority 
rule” and the extensive required disclosures are likely to reduce the 
possibility of insiders or equity holders receiving a payout at the expense of 
creditors.106 
However, there are certain indelible drawbacks of a plan confirmation. 
First, the debtor will likely require exit financing in order for the business to 
be viable post-bankruptcy—a problem that may be especially acute in 
markets, such as the current one, in which credit is tight.107 The plan 
                                                                                                                                          
 98. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (2006). 
 99. See id. § 1129(a)(11). Feasibility may be raised by any non-consenting creditor or the court 
may analyze it sua sponte. See In re Malkus, Inc., No. 03-07711-GLP, 2004 WL 3202212, at *4 
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. Nov. 15, 2004). 
 100. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (2006). 
 101. Id. § 1129(a)(11); see In re Malkus, 2004 WL 3202212, at *4. 
 102. See Malkus, 2004 WL 3202212, at *4 (“Pursuant to § 1129(a)(11) a plan of reorganization 
must be feasible. ‘Although success does not have to be guaranteed, the Court is obligated to 
scrutinize a plan carefully to determine whether it offers a reasonable prospect of success and is 
workable.’”) (quoting In re Yates Development, 258 B.R. 36, 44 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2000)). 
 103. See, e.g., id. 
 104. See Rose, supra note 22, at 256–58 (discussing the voting, classification and good faith 
requirements as hallmarks of the Bankruptcy Code’s protection of creditors). 
 105. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 106. See Sloane, supra note 22, at 39–45.  
 107. See Melvin Richardson, How Does a Tight Credit Market Affect the Economy?, 
ASSOCIATED CONTENT FROM YAHOO (Oct. 30, 2008), http://www.associatedcontent.com/ 
article/1138008/how_does_a_tight_credit_market_affect.html. 
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confirmation period may take an inconveniently long time.108 During this 
period, the debtor’s business, being tied up in court proceedings,109 may 
suffer significant reputational damage.110 This reputational damage, coupled 
with the debtor’s inability to obtain financing and the costs of running the 
bankruptcy itself—including legal fees—may strain the business to the 
point of collapse, causing the case to be converted to Chapter 7111 and the 
creditors to lose the “going concern value” that Chapter 11 is intended to 
preserve.112 
B. SCHOLARLY DEBATE OVER § 363(b) SALES: PANACEA 
FOR LARGE BUSINESS REORGANIZATIONS OR AN 
ALTERNATIVE VULNERABLE TO ABUSE? 
Many academics have supported the use of § 363(b) sales.113 One 
argument is that they insulate the sales of going concern businesses, 
whereby sums of money are guaranteed and parties will determine 
distributions after the sale from long confirmation processes.114 In a plan 
reorganization, the business entity is kept within the bankruptcy estate for a 
substantial period of time, where it incurs significant legal and 
administrative costs, must secure operating capital, and suffers reputational 
damage.115 In a § 363(b) sale, the debtor need not obtain DIP financing,116 
                                                                                                                                          
 108. See generally Miller & Waisman, supra note 21. Bankruptcy cases may take years to 
complete whereas a § 363(b) sale may be consummated in a few months, or even significantly 
less. See generally id. 
 109. Id. at 187–89 (arguing that bankruptcy proceedings may evolve into a confrontation of 
wills, where a creditor may prolong the process in hopes of forcing a concession). 
 110. Lynn M. LoPucki & Sara D. Kalin, The Failure of Public Company Bankruptcies in 
Delaware and New York: Empirical Evidence of a “Race to the Bottom”, 54 VAND. L. REV. 231, 
235–36 (2001) (describing reputation damage along with other distractions that companies suffer 
from bankruptcies, which leads to reorganized public companies filing repeatedly for bankruptcy 
protection). 
 111. 11 U.S.C. § 1112 (2006) (listing the requirements that allow a party of interest, “after 
notice and a hearing,” to petition the court for conversion of the case to a chapter 7 liquidation). 
 112. See In re 15375 Memorial Corp., 400 B.R. 420, 427 (D. Del. 2009) (“preserving a going 
concern” or “maximizing the value of the debtor’s estate” are goals of filing for bankruptcy 
protection) (citation omitted). 
 113. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 21; Miller & Waisman, supra note 21; Paul N. Silverstein & 
Harold Jones, The Evolving Role of Bankruptcy Judges Under the Bankruptcy Code, 51 BROOK. 
L. REV. 555 (1985). 
 114. See generally Miller & Waisman, supra note 21 (discussing the many obstacles that have 
entered the reorganization plan confirmation process, including strategic objections, employee and 
key vendor benefits and greater costs). 
 115. See generally id. Greater sophistication by creditors and an increasingly service based 
economy has turned the Chapter 11 landscape into a more contentious process that may no longer 
yield the “going concern” premium that formerly existed in the railroad bankruptcies. See id. at 
182 (“[D]istressed debt traders' entry into the reorganization paradigm has transformed Chapter 11 
reorganizations from primarily rehabilitative processes to dual-purpose processes that stress 
maximum enhancement of creditor recovery in addition to rehabilitation of the debtor entity.”). 
 116. See generally David A. Skeel, Jr., The Past, Present and Future of Debtor-In-Possession 
Financing, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1905 (2004) (describing the history and current use of “DIP 
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which may be unavailable or only available at a substantial rate.117 The sale, 
it is argued, provides a level of certainty that a plan confirmation cannot: it 
ensures that a level of assets that will be split among creditors and obviates 
the need for a time-consuming and expensive valuation finding during plan 
confirmation.118 Creditors also need not focus on the workings of the 
business or fear that the business will leak losses, implode, and require 
liquidation.119 The sale of the assets, if performed correctly, would also 
likely yield a more reliable price than expert valuations presented to a 
bankruptcy judge,120 a result in line with the Code’s policy of preferring 
market valuation when possible.121 
                                                                                                                                          
financing”). DIP financing refers to financing made available to a debtor during the course of its 
bankruptcy proceedings in order to finance the ongoing restructuring as well as a viable 
reorganization. See generally id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 364 (2006) (providing courts with power to 
approve financing for the debtor in possession). 
 117. See Lee, supra note 21, at 546. A quick sale of assets may be necessary where a business 
runs out of cash collateral financing and DIP financing is unavailable. See id. 
 118. See George W. Kuney, Let's Make It Official: Adding an Explicit Preplan Sale Process as 
an Alternative Exit From Bankruptcy, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 1265, 1270 (2004) (“[T]he insolvency 
community has embraced the nonplan sale of substantially all the assets of a debtor's business as 
an efficient alternative to the costly and lengthy plan confirmation process.”) (internal citations 
omitted). 363(b) sales secure a price for a firm’s assets and allow creditors to focus on achieving a 
plan to distribute assets. See id. 
Further, by reducing the assets of the estate to cash, a note secured by the assets sold, 
the stock of the purchaser, or some other similar form of fungible valuable 
consideration, the tasks and costs of postsale management and administration of a 
debtor and its estate can be dramatically reduced. 
Id. at 1270–71 (internal citations omitted). This will reduce monitoring cost as the creditors no 
longer must analyze market conditions or the managerial decisions of the debtor. See id. 
In turn, this allows for a reduction in the amount of a debtor's value that is redistributed 
from prepetition creditors to postpetition administrative claimants as a case drags on. It 
takes little in the way of a management team to preside over an estate comprised solely 
of liquid assets. 
Id. at 1271 (internal citations omitted). 
 119. See 11 U.S.C. § 1112 (2006) (requiring that a company that is unable to emerge from 
chapter 11 as a viable entity will either be converted to chapter 7 liquidation or the bankruptcy 
case will be dismissed). 
 120. See Barry E. Adler & Ian Ayres, A Dilution Mechanism for Valuing Corporations in 
Bankruptcy, 111 YALE L.J. 83, 90 (2001) (“Not only do judges lack the business expertise of 
individual capital investors, but also a judicial valuation cannot benefit from the collective 
wisdom of market investors in the aggregate. As a result, even unbiased judges make mistakes that 
a market process would not permit.”). An open and populated market should yield efficient 
outcomes, demonstrating the true value of the asset. See Oversight of TARP Assistance to the 
Automobile Industry: Field Hearing Before the Congressional Oversight Panel, 111th Cong. 97–
108 (2009) (statement of Barry E. Adler, Professor of Law, New York University School of Law) 
(advocating putting all large § 363(b) sales through a stringent market test to ensure fair price and 
prevent abuses) [hereinafter Automotive Field Hearings Memorandum]. 
 121. See In re Iridium Operating LLC, 373 B.R. 283, 293 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“[T]he 
public trading market constitutes an impartial gauge of investor confidence and remains the best 
and most unbiased measure of fair market value and, when available to the Court, is the preferred 
standard of valuation.”) (citing VFB LLC v. Campbell Soup Co., 482 F.3d 624 (3d Cir. 2007)). 
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Looking at these benefits—including shorter time in bankruptcy, 
certainty, fewer resources used—as a whole, it may be difficult to dispute 
the use of these sales procedures. In fact, some academics believe that the § 
363(b) sale is the future of bankruptcy and that few if any large 
bankruptcies benefit from a drawn out confirmation plan.122 Others, while 
not ruling out the usefulness of the plan confirmation process, contend that 
the process is no longer viable for large distressed businesses and that, 
absent major revisions to the Code, the § 363(b) sale may be, in certain 
circumstances, a useful and prudent solution.123 
While there is major support for the use of § 363(b) sales, there are 
critics who argue that the procedure is fraught with possibilities for abuse 
and enables parties to effectuate sweetheart deals.124 These critics argue that 
the use of § 363(b) sales increases the ability of insiders to engage in self-
dealing, given the lighter scrutiny to which the sales are subjected.125 They 
argue further that benefits to insiders such as continued employment, 
assignment of liability, and even payment may be provided by the 
purchaser in exchange for the debtor supporting and obtaining approval of 
the sale, and that this may be particularly true in § 363(b) sales in which a 
parent company or former equity holders acquire the business.126 
Imperfections in valuation and the auction procedures used by various 
bankruptcy courts may allow a creditor or third party to purchase a business 
at well below value.127 Commentators argue that because insiders do not 
usually gain in the distribution of assets, it may be worthwhile for them to 
sell to a third party at below market value while receiving an outside 
benefit, such as those described in the previous paragraph.128 Further, if the 
debtor has special knowledge about the business and is in the best position 
to value the company, she may also be in the best position to argue for a 
low valuation and provide the benefit to a purchaser at the cost of 
creditors.129 Commentators have responded differently to this problem of 
valuation. Some have responded by arguing for a market test, whereby 
market forces will dictate the fair price for the asset and prevent abuses that 
stem from undervaluation.130 Other commentators argue that a market test 
                                                                                                                                          
 122. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 21, at 562. 
 123. See Miller & Waisman, supra note 21, at 199–200. 
 124. See generally Rose, supra note 22. 
 125. See id. at 277–80 (arguing that the debtor in possession may have conflicts of interest that 
encourage selling to insiders or affiliated companies and may yield deals that provide a windfall 
for third parties at the expense of creditors). 
 126. See id. 
 127. See id. at 277–78 (discussing how manipulation of valuations and auction procedures can 
lead to depressed pricing). 
 128. See LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 22, at 30–31. 
 129. See Rose, supra note 22, at 277–78 (describing how insiders profited when Polaroid was 
sold for $465 million despite $1.8 billion in assets). 
 130. See Automotive Field Hearings Memorandum, supra note 120 (discussing how open 
auctions will reveal when parties are receiving unduly favorable terms). 
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cannot cure the abuses and inappropriate outcomes that flow from the speed 
and absence of disclosure in § 363(b) sales.131 
There also exists the possibility that a § 363(b) sale will be used to 
effectuate a sub rosa plan in which the purchaser can gain significant 
returns at the expense of other creditors.132 As part of a sale, ownership of 
the traded asset may be distributed; in General Motors, for example, both 
the employee pension fund and the union received significant portions of 
the new company without a commensurate contribution of capital.133 
Although such transactions meet the technical definition of a sub rosa plan, 
they are not always labeled as such, effectively allowing the debtor to 
distribute assets without complying with the plan confirmation 
requirements of § 1129 of the Code.134 Commentators have been especially 
wary of these kinds of sales, as creditors will not only lose in their payout 
but are also locked out of the process.135 
Those opposing the current proliferation of § 363(b) sales do not 
necessarily contest its use in all circumstances or deny its appeal; instead, 
they argue for increased procedural safeguards or limitations.136 They claim 
that these procedures should be subject to a more stringent inquiry into 
whether the plan does, in fact, constitute a sub rosa plan bypassing the 
safeguards of a plan confirmation process.137 Additionally, some 
commentators argue for a market test for § 363(b) sales so as to ensure that 
insiders are not effecting “sweetheart deals,”138 whereas others argue for a 
heightened “business justification” standard.139 These concerns highlight 
the procedural disadvantages of § 363(b) sales despite acknowledging the 
great benefits that may accrue from their use. From this, it becomes clear 
that availability of § 363(b) sales procedures should be preserved—and 
possibly encouraged—but that precautions must be taken to prevent the 
types of abuses to which they are currently susceptible. 
III. PROPOSED SOLUTION 
This note has focused on two areas of abuse that exist in § 363(b) sales: 
1) the ability of insiders or other parties to purchase the company at below 
                                                                                                                                          
 131. See, e.g., LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 22, at 40–45. 
 132. See Sloane, supra note 22, at 60–63. 
 133. In re General Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 482–83 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 134. See Sloane, supra note 22, at 51 (discussing how decisions applying Braniff have generally 
allowed § 363(b) sales to go through, which alleviates the debtor’s need to make disclosure or 
gather consenting creditor votes). 
 135. See id. at 62. 
 136. See, e.g., Automotive Field Hearings Memorandum, supra note 120, at 106–08; LoPucki & 
Doherty, supra note 22, at 44–45; Rose, supra note 22, at 283–84. 
 137. See Sloane, supra note 22, at 62. 
 138. See Automotive Field Hearings, supra note 120 (advocating for a true market test to ensure 
that sale value is maximized and that the sale does not deprive creditors’ of the safeguards that the 
Bankruptcy Code provides them). 
 139. See Rose, supra note 22, at 283–84. 
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market value; and 2) the ability of the debtor or insiders to compel a sale in 
order to secure a benefit for themselves at the expense of creditors. These 
abuses can be significantly reduced by employing a robust market test that 
includes disclosure of all terms of the sale, adequate time for bidders to 
respond, and a centralized forum to receive—and notify all affected parties 
of—purchase bids.140 
 Additionally, where a quick sale is required and a meaningful market 
test cannot be implemented, the standard for justifying the sale should be 
heightened.141 These changes will provide fairness and credibility, and will 
limit uses of § 363(b) sales to subvert the Code’s protection of creditors.142 
A. A ROBUST MARKET TEST 
Academics and practitioners have proposed that § 363(b) sales should 
require a market test to ensure that the price paid for assets in the sale is 
fair, and to provide interested bidders with a forum to purchase the 
property.143 Proponents of a market test argue that it provides safeguards 
necessary to ensure fairness and prevent abuse.144 First—assuming the 
existence of an efficient and populated market—arbitrageurs, speculators, 
and other participants should theoretically raise the company’s value to its 
“market price.”145 This would prevent insiders from colluding with a 
purchaser to sell the company at an artificially low price in exchange for 
side benefit.146 Similarly, the market test may attract purchasers who can 
significantly raise the returns of the company, possibly through synergies or 
economies of scale.147 If details of the sale are made public and scrutinized, 
                                                                                                                                          
 140. See generally Adler, supra note 14, at 317–18 (proposing the “sort of process that state law 
would provide shareholders of a solvent firm”). 
 141. See Rose, supra note 22, at 283 (“The complexities of a § 363 sale require intensified 
scrutiny because of the dangers of debtor manipulation of market forces.”). 
 142. See discussion supra Part II.A (detailing the protections afforded to creditors in a 
bankruptcy plan reorganization). 
 143. See generally Rachael M. Jackson, Note, Responding to Threats of Bankruptcy Abuse in a 
Post-Enron World: Trusting the Bankruptcy Judge as the Guardian of Debtor Estates, 2005 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 451; see also, Rose, supra note 22. 
 144. See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 
751, 786–88 (2002); Lee, supra note 21, at 536–37. 
 145. See Daniel R. Fischel, Market Evidence in Corporate Law, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 941, 942 
(2002) (“The fair market value of an asset is generally defined as the price at which the asset 
would change hands in a transaction between a willing buyer and a willing seller when neither is 
under any compulsion to buy or sell and both are reasonably informed.”).  
 146. See id. at 947 (acknowledging that a price below fair value will attract other purchasers). 
 147. See Bernard S. Black, Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 STAN. L. REV. 598, 608 
(1989). 
An important source of potential gain from takeovers is synergy between buyer and 
seller that permits the merged company to be run more efficiently. Three sources of 
synergy can be distinguished: (i) operating synergy resulting from economies of scale 
or scope; (ii) improved management of the target; and (iii) financial or managerial 
synergy due to more efficient use of capital or management talent. 
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proponents of the sale will, in theory, be deterred from engaging in fraud or 
side deals. Thus, the market test may also provide a level of certainty and 
fairness simply from its procedure.148 
This model of market arbitrage and an effective market test may be 
criticized as simple and overly optimistic as it assumes a populated market, 
low transaction costs, and complete information.149 Although such 
conditions, or even conditions approaching these, are unlikely, bankruptcy 
courts may foster a more favorable environment for bidders to produce a 
populated auction and thereby increase possible revenue.150 To emulate 
such optimal market conditions, a robust effective market test should 
require: 1) full disclosure of proposed bids; 2) adequate time to respond to 
the bids by all parties and purchasers; and 3) creditor and judicial review of 
competing bids. 
1. FULL DISCLOSURE OF SALE TERMS 
A debtor loses many privacy protections that it had outside of 
bankruptcy, including required post-petition disclosure when proposing the 
confirmation plan.151 Also, a debtor is required to accept better bids, if 
offered, in a § 363(b) sale.152 However, these alone may be insufficient to 
ensure an effective market test. 
Under the current regime, the complete details of a sale are not always 
provided, made public, or even available.153 While requiring a purchasing 
company to reveal all elements of its purchase and act as a “stalking horse” 
may be harsh, the protections that the bankruptcy sale will provide them—
including the ability to purchase “free and clear” of encumbrances154 and 
the limited appealability of § 363(b) sales155—should make for a fair 
                                                                                                                                          
Id. 
 148. See Rose, supra note 22, at 277–83. 
 149. See Fischel, supra note 145, at 944–47 (discussing unrealistic assumptions underlying 
analysis of fair market price). 
 150. See generally Steven B. Katz, Note, Designing and Executing a “Fair” Revlon Auction, 
17 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 163, 183 (1989) (“[I]ncreasing the number of bidders in an auction 
increases the probability of a particular bidder having the highest valuation, thereby usually 
raising the seller's revenue.”).  
 151. See 11 U.S.C. § 1125 (2006). 
 152. See In re Gulf States Steel, Inc. of Ala., 285 B.R. 497, 517 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2002) (citing 
In re Lionel, 722 F.2d 1063 (2d Cir. 1983)) (“In a liquidation case it is ‘legally essential’ to 
approve the highest offer . . . .”); see generally Revlon Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 
Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986) (requiring the Board of Directors, in a sale of control context, to 
maximize shareholder’s equity). 
 153. See Rose, supra note 22, at 260 (“With a § 363 sale, fewer people receive less information, 
and the lack of a disclosure requirement weakens creditor leverage . . . .”). 
 154. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2006). 
 155. Id. § 363(m).  
The reversal or modification on appeal of an authorization under subsection (b) or (c) of 
this section of a sale or lease of property does not affect the validity of a sale or lease 
under such authorization to an entity that purchased or leased such property in good 
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tradeoff. By making details of the transaction and proposals public, 
potential purchasers will be able to assess the fairness of current proposals, 
and may outbid current offers that undervalue the company, in an attempt to 
receive a profit.156 
Additionally, companies do not necessarily submit bids that only differ 
in price or in a limited number of provisions; quite the opposite, bids for 
distressed companies often vary widely.157 One purchaser may provide a 
higher price but will dismantle the company for its assets and consumer 
base,158 while another plan may infuse capital and expertise into expanding 
the business but at a lower price.159 Depending on the particular 
circumstances of the distressed business, either plan may prove to be a 
better solution for the creditors and for the public at large. 
Only by making full disclosure of the bids submitted can interested and 
official parties effectively evaluate which of multiple proposals to accept.160 
Increasing the availability of information will serve two purposes for 
potential purchasers. First, it will lower transaction costs to bidders, 
enabling them to base their offers on a better evaluation of the company.161 
Second, because an offer will serve as an indicator of the selling company’s 
value,162 hesitant market participants may be reassured of the soundness of 
an investment in the company, thus increasing the likelihood of a 
competitive auction.163 
                                                                                                                                          
faith, whether or not such entity knew of the pendency of the appeal, unless such 
authorization and such sale or lease were stayed pending appeal. 
Id. 
 156. See generally Katz, supra note 150, at 184–85 (describing “Revlon” type auctions where 
“[b]y increasing his bid, the bidder decreases his potential profit, but increases his probability of 
winning. . . . [which forces the bidder to] close the gap between his bid and his honest valuation”). 
 157. Compare In re Chrysler LLC (Chrysler I), 405 B.R. 84 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (approving 
a sale of a business for ownership and infusion of capital and expertise in a transaction between 
Fiat and Chrysler); with In re Enron Corp., 291 B.R. 39, 40 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (approving a straight 
sale of a business entity for cash or its equivalent). 
 158. See, e.g., Enron, 291 B.R. at 40 (approving the sale of Enron Wind Corp., a subsidiary of 
Enron Corp., to General Electric Co. for a combination of cash and assumption of liabilities).  
 159. See, e.g., Chrysler I, 405 B.R. at 96 (approving the sale following consideration the 
synergies that Fiat could provide Chrysler, including new technologies and an international 
network, in ordering the § 363(b) sale). 
 160. Theodore N. Mirvis & Andrew J. Nussbaum, Mergers and Acquisitions and Takeover 
Preparedness, 907 PLI/CORP. HANDBOOK SERIES 501, 536–37(1995) (the board of directors in a 
change of control context must analyze all factors of a bid including price, feasibility and identity 
of the bidder in calculating the “best value” for its shareholders). 
 161. See generally David E. Van Zandt, The Market as a Property Institution: Rules for the 
Trading of Financial Assets, 32 B.C. L. REV. 967, 985–86 (1991). 
 162. See generally id. 
 163. See Katz, supra note 150, at 187–88 (“[An] advantage of the seller publicizing information 
is that the cost of preparing a bid is lowered. Lower bid preparation costs may entice additional 
bidders to enter the auction, thereby creating a more competitive auction and increasing the seller's 
expected return.”). 
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Full disclosure would also reveal and deter fraud or insider dealing as it 
does in federal securities law.164 There are three categories of entities that 
have an incentive to find self-dealing, fraud, or other problems in the plan. 
Official entities, such as the court or a United States trustee, will be 
attentive to these problems as part of their official duty.165 Second, creditors 
that stand to be impaired by the sale have the incentive to scrutinize and 
oppose it for such imperfections.166 Finally, competing purchasers are also 
in a position to analyze the plan for faults and may profit by outbidding for 
what they deem to be an undervalued asset.167 Full disclosure will provide 
all of these parties the means to analyze bids and ferret out abuse. 
Requiring the parties proposing a § 363(b) sale to make full disclosure 
should encourage market participants to bid on the asset in question.168 
Competitive bids such as these are more likely to result in a fair market 
valuation of the sale asset.169 Ultimately, disclosure is beneficial because it 
disincentivizes the proposing parties from engaging in fraud, self-dealing, 
or other abuses that they would not want exposed to the public. 
2. ADEQUATE TIME FOR MARKET PLAYERS TO 
RESPOND TO THE SALE. 
In addition to requiring disclosure of the details of the § 363(b) sales, 
the court should provide sufficient time to market players to respond to the 
test and bid on the company. In order for a market test to reveal whether a 
price is fair or if other purchasers can provide better terms, there needs to be 
a sufficient opportunity for bidders to research, plan, and draft competing 
proposals.170 Potential purchasers must be provided with enough time to 
formulate bids and be assured that their bids will be given proper 
                                                                                                                                          
 164. See generally Richard E. Mendales, Looking Under the Rock: Disclosure of Bankruptcy 
Issues Under the Securities Laws, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 731, 738–39 (1996) (explaining how 
disclosure in securities law serves a regulatory purpose allowing interested private parties to 
monitor themselves). 
 165. U.S. Trustee Program, Strategic Plan & Mission, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
http://www.justice.gov/ust/eo/ust_org/mission.htm (“The USTP's mission is to promote integrity 
and efficiency in the nation’s bankruptcy system by enforcing bankruptcy laws, providing 
oversight of private trustees, and maintaining operational excellence.”). 
 166. See Barry L. Zaretsky, Fraudulent Transfer Law as the Arbiter of Unreasonable Risk, 46 
S.C. L. REV. 1165, 1172–73 (1995) (arguing that “impaired debtors who receive less than 
reasonably equivalent value may unfairly or improperly harm creditors even when the debtor did 
not have intention to cause harm to its creditors[,]” thereby incentivizing creditors to scrutinize 
debtor activities). 
 167. See generally Katz, supra note 150, at 181–88. 
 168. See id. at 187. 
 169. See id.  
 170. See LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 22, at 25–26, 41–42 (finding that there were 
significant costs, in the range of $5 million, in formulating a bid in a § 363(b) sale and recovery 
rates in such sales increased with the length of the market test). 
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attention.171 A sale that does not provide sufficient time for market players 
to respond to proposals will be ineffective and merely pro forma.172 
To ensure that adequate notice for market participation exists, the court 
can publish the terms of the sale and an invitation for competing bids. This 
type of publication should be tailored to the target audience and costs can 
vary with the value of the asset being sold.173 Thus, while taking out a 
newspaper ad for a large corporation—such as General Motors or 
Chrysler—is worthwhile, it would be unreasonable to require it for a small 
asset, as the cost of publication would significantly reduce payouts to 
creditors.174 
This notice should provide a timeline in which offers will be accepted 
and evaluated.175 The period must be clear as the parties that will expend 
resources on preparing and submitting a bid will need assurance that their 
bids will be adequately reviewed and considered against the current sale 
agreement.176 
It is reasonable for investors to be wary of participating in a market test. 
The drafters of the sale may argue that losing their initial agreement may 
cause uncertainty, and that subsequent bids may change terms that have 
already been considered and accepted.177 However, for the market test to be 
effective, new bids must be evaluated on equal footing with the proposed 
agreement.178 A period in which all proposals are considered—along with 
the requirement that bids be considered by both the court and impaired 
creditors179—is a proper solution to this problem because it ensures that if a 
new and better offer is proposed with a reasonable time frame, it may 
replace the agreed upon sale. 
                                                                                                                                          
 171. See id. at 26 (finding that although “the recovery ratio for a reorganized company 
decreases with time in bankruptcy[,] . . . the recovery ratio of a sold company increases with time 
in bankruptcy”). 
 172. Publication and adequate time to formulate a bid are factors that should foster greater 
bidder participation in order to maximize price. See generally Katz, supra note 150, at 183, 187. 
 173.  See Automotive Field Hearings Memorandum, supra note 120, at 107 (proposing that 
auction procedures should not apply to small businesses as they would be unable to recoup the 
costs). 
 174. See id. (arguing that publication of terms and market tests may not be feasible for smaller 
assets). 
 175. But see id. 
 176. Proponents of a § 363(b) sale are however reluctant to entertain competing offers and stifle 
true bidding through selecting a “stalking horse” and implementing short bidding periods once the 
“stalking horse” has been selected. See LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 22, at 35–36. 
 177. See Mark J. Roe & David Skeel, Assessing the Chrysler Bankruptcy, 108 MICH. L. REV. 
727, 747–51 (2010) (describing the bidding process in Chrysler and how there was a requirement 
that new bids be approved by multiple committees and conform to standards enacted by the 
proponent, which demonstrates a sale proponent’s desire to consummate an existing offer so as 
not to lose its proverbial “bird in the hand”). 
 178. See Katz, supra note 150, at 175 (arguing that sellers need to be committed to the auction 
process for bidders to put forth their best offers). 
 179. See discussion infra Part III.A.3. 
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Finally, the adequate time provision must give investors sufficient time 
to formulate and propose a competing bid.180 The amount of time necessary 
should depend on the size of the asset, current market conditions, liquidity 
of the asset, and prior shopping for purchasers, among other factors.181 For 
example, a large asset such as an automotive manufacturer may require that 
purchasing companies seek outside funding, thus raising the time necessary 
to form a bid. Similarly, in tight capital conditions, such as those of the 
current economy, bidders may require more time to secure the capital for 
the purchase. A court implementing a market test must be cognizant of 
these factors to ensure that the market test is an effective one. 
3. CREDITOR AND JUDICIAL REVIEW OF COMPETING 
BIDS 
A third requirement that will provide for an effective market test is 
review of competing bids by the court and by impaired creditors. This 
requirement is important because: 1) it will provide for impartial review of 
bids that benefit creditors as a class and incentivize the bidding process;182 
2) it will deter insiders from proposing “sweetheart” or self-interested 
deals;183 and 3) it will create a centralized forum to receive and evaluate 
bids. 
The first benefit of requiring review by parties other than the proponent 
of the § 363(b) sale184 is that potential bidders will have more confidence 
that their bids will be reviewed and that their diligence will not go to 
waste.185 As with the adequate time provision, this element facilitates the 
environment necessary for a competitive bidding process.186 
                                                                                                                                          
 180. See Warburton, supra note 13, at 567. 
363 sales proceeded at an unnecessarily fast pace. The bankruptcy courts in each case 
required that any competing bid be submitted within a matter of days. Critics cite the 
short amount of time permitted for competing 363 bids as an additional constraint 
imposed on the bidding process. In other words, the speed of the process purportedly 
discouraged the submission of competing bids, impeding a true market valuation of the 
assets. 
Id. 
 181. See Automotive Field Hearings Memorandum, supra note 120, at 107 (advocating for 
market test to conform to state law requirements and provide bidders with adequate time to 
formulate their bids). 
 182. See Katz, supra note 150, at 178 (describing how bidders will be disincentivized from 
participating in an auction if there is a significant risk that their bid will fail). 
 183. See Rose, supra note 22, at 272–83. 
 184. This could include either the creditors, perhaps through a committee of unsecured 
creditors, or by the court. 
 185. See generally Robert U. Sattin, Finality in Auction Sales: It Ain't Over Till It's Over, 23 
AM. BANKR. INST. J., 52, 53 (2004) (describing the finality of auctions as a necessary element that 
ensures that bidders are confident that their bids will receive due consideration and will not be 
upset by subsequent events); see also generally Katz, supra note 150. 
 186. See generally Katz, supra note 150 (creating an auction that entices bidders will draw 
more bidders and in turn increase the probability of obtaining a higher bid price). 
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The second benefit of third party review of competing bids is that it 
should deter proponents from proposing plans with an unfairly low price or 
that retain benefits to themselves.187 If a party realizes that its attempt at 
deceiving the system will likely be caught, it is less likely to engage in the 
devious conduct.188  
The test will also provide a centralized forum for the receipt of bids, 
affording some measure of assurance and cost savings to bidding parties.189 
Although not as significant as the other elements described, requiring 
creditors and the court to consider all bids will provide an auction 
atmosphere in which parties may compete with each other in the open. This 
will ensure that the debtor cannot unfairly discriminate among purchasers 
and will also lower the transaction costs for bidding parties of obtaining 
information.190 Finally, and optimistically, such a centralized forum may 
facilitate a bidding war that will increase the purchase price to the benefit of 
all creditors.191 
The elements of the robust market test are designed to mimic a 
competitive market and provide the protections similar to those of a 
reorganization plan confirmation. They are also meant to ensure a proper 
review of the sale, and to give outsiders and creditors leverage over a self-
interested sale proponent as well as provide them with more satisfaction 
from the process. 
4. A ROBUST MARKET TEST CAN BE EFFECTIVE 
Some current commentary contends that market sales are either 
ineffective, difficult to implement, cost prohibitive, or some combination of 
all three.192 While it is not argued that the steps outlined above will provide 
an optimal solution, this note’s proposal takes these arguments into account. 
It is conceded that a market test may not be possible under all 
circumstances, nor is it feasible that all market tests should be equally 
                                                                                                                                          
 187. See generally LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 22 (discussing the side dealings and abuses 
that occur in an undervalued § 363(b) sale); see also Rose, supra note 22. 
 188. See generally Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: an Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. 
ECON. 169, 176–78 (1968) (outlining the deterrence effect and arguing that criminals take costs of 
their actions into account when committing crimes, that costs are measured by the sanction for the 
act, and are multiplied by the chance of being caught). Under the deterrence theory, raising either 
the sanction or the probability of being caught makes the action less valuable and hence deters a 
potential actor from engaging in the act. Id. 
 189. See LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 22, at 5 (“[T]he high costs of evaluating companies, 
combined with the low probability of success for competing bidders, discourages competitive 
bids.”). 
 190. See Katz, supra note 150, at 187–88. 
 191. See id. at 183. 
 192. See, e.g., LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 22, at 41–45 (reporting results from a study of 
recent § 363(b) sales that yielded results that found that sales undervalue the company as 
compared to a plan reorganization and failed to bring in competing bids). 
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stringent.193 The type and duration of the market test, the form of marketing 
devices to be used, and the choice between a formal bidding process and an 
auction, should all be determined on a case-by-case basis.194 
Criticisms that a market test would prove ineffective are based on faults 
with the procedures currently in use, not with the market test concept 
itself.195 It has been argued that market tests fail to bring in bidders and do 
little to no good in raising § 363(b) sale prices or deterring abuse.196 
However, the three elements of the proposed robust market test would 
alleviate such problems. First, requiring greater disclosure would give 
potential bidders greater access to the information they need to formulate a 
bid that they believe will be successful.197 Second, an adequate period of 
time would allow more players to enter the bidding process and provide 
them with more incentive to prepare and submit bids.198 Third, an impartial 
weighing of bids would provide outside bidders a greater opportunity to 
present their case and have their bids considered.199 While this may not 
entirely eliminate the problems of the current § 363(b) market test, they will 
make the market tests more effective and provide greater certainty as to 
adequacy of price while deterring abuse. 
B. HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY OF THE “TIME IS OF THE 
ESSENCE” SALE 
One important and controversial justification for the use of § 363(b) 
sales and their quick implementation is the “time is of the essence” 
rationale.200 This justification relies on an extrinsic factor—usually a back-
out date in a sale agreement—to require the quick ordering of a sale before 
the purchaser pulls out and/or the business implodes.201 Both the Chrysler 
and General Motors cases employed this justification for their expedited 
                                                                                                                                          
 193. See Automotive Field Hearings Memorandum, supra note 120, at 107. 
 194. See id. A market test must be tailored to the asset being sold as well as the prospective 
market. See id. Particularly, the cost of the auction must not be so large in comparison with 
projected proceeds as to make the auction unreasonable. See id. 
 195. See, e.g., LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 22, at 41 (debtors often offer bid incentives to 
the stalking horse making subsequent offers harder to obtain); Rose, supra note 22, at 282 (“The 
market cannot correct deal protection fees, credit bidding, and disparity in bidders' information. 
Additionally, the debtor's ability to limit participants even with open auctions makes the courts' 
use of market exposure as an objective standard insufficient as well.”). 
 196. LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 22, at 41–42. 
 197. See discussion supra Part III.A.1. 
 198. See discussion supra Part III.A.2. 
 199. See discussion supra Part III.A.3. 
 200. See, e.g., In re Thomson McKinnon Sec., Inc., 120 B.R. 301, 307 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
 201. See, e.g., In re General Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 480 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009); In re 
Titusville Country Club, 128 B.R. 396, 397 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1991); Equity Funding Corp. of Am. 
v. Financial Assocs., 492 F.2d 793, 793 (9th Cir. 1974). 
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sales202 and it has been established as a valid justification in a variety of 
circumstances.203 
“Time is of the essence” has been criticized by certain academics. One 
argument against the justification is that it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
determine whether the purchaser will actually back out of the deal204 or if 
the back-out date is being used to subvert the bankruptcy process and avoid 
scrutiny.205 Another argument is that it provides perverse incentives to the 
management of an ailing business to only declare bankruptcy when a “drop 
dead date” is imminent and the business is unable to withstand a lengthy 
bankruptcy.206 
A solution must deter purchasers from abusing the bankruptcy system 
while providing the court with the flexibility needed to address novel and 
drastic situations. Because a quick sale will preclude an effective market 
test and the safeguards that the test ensures, courts should require the 
proponents of a “time is of the essence” § 363(b) sale to face heightened 
scrutiny.207 Those invoking the justification should be required to provide 
compelling reason for the necessity of the sale and the deadline. The court 
should also analyze the substance of deals for insider benefit and self-
dealing.208 Further, because the market test and this heightened scrutiny are 
designed to combat abuse, the court may lower the level of scrutiny 
involved where time for a market test is provided, even though truncated, 
while heightening scrutiny of sales with imminent sale dates.  
                                                                                                                                          
 202. See In re Chrysler LLC (Chrysler I), 405 B.R. 84, 96–97 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(considering the timeline set out by Fiat for the Chrysler merger in ordering the sale); General 
Motors, 407 B.R. at 480 (considering the United State Government’s requirement that the sale be 
consummated quickly as justification for ordering the sale). 
 203. See, e.g., In re Thomson McKinnon, 120 B.R. at 307. 
Time is of the essence because the contracts with the key employees will expire by 
January 2, 1991, whereas the trustees of the Funds have threatened to terminate their 
arrangements with the Partnership if a prospective purchaser is not promptly approved 
who could offer investment management services which would meet with their 
approval. 
Id.; In re Oneida Lake, Inc., 114 B.R. 352, 355–57 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1990) (ordering a sale based 
on rapidly decreasing market value and an open sale, despite not using “time of the essence” 
language). 
 204. See Sloane, supra note 22, at 60–61. 
 205. See id. (arguing that expedited sales procedures may be used to disenfranchise creditor 
voting and “short circuit” bankruptcy safeguards). 
 206. See General Motors, 407 B.R. at 480; see also LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 22, at 37 
(discussing the probable effect of a drop dead date on the sale price). 
 207. See Roe & Skeel, supra note 177, at 749 (noting that the bidding process in Chrysler 
occurred in a little more than a week, giving bidders insufficient time to perform due diligence or 
obtain financing, thereby circumventing the protection that the market test is intended to provide). 
 208. See, e.g., Rose, supra note 22, at 280–83 (discussing the ability of the debtor to circumvent 
an effective market test and to distort valuation requiring “intensified scrutiny”). 
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1. THE NECESSITY OF THE SALE/DEADLINE ANALYSIS 
Courts, following Lionel, require the proponent of a § 363(b) sale to 
provide “good business justification” for implementing the sale.209 In “time 
is of the essence” cases, the need to effect a sale before the termination date 
of purchase contract along with a showing that the sale is in the best 
interests of the creditors has been sustained as sufficiently good 
justifications for the § 363(b) sale.210 This analysis requires that the sale 
provide at least as much as to creditors as a liquidation of the company’s 
assets.211 Further, it must be shown that it is unlikely that a market test 
would fetch a higher price for the company.212 Courts also require that the 
sale be necessary, either by showing that the company will be unable to 
secure financing to fund its bankruptcy213 or that the company is wasting 
away in the bankruptcy process.214 
When a “time is of the essence” justification is used, courts may lower 
the scrutiny given to the factors provided in Lionel.215 The need to 
implement a sale while there is a willing purchaser may pressure the parties 
or the court to accept a sale.216 Further, due to the speed of many § 363(b) 
sales, full inquiry into the facts of the bankruptcy or the terms of the sale 
may not be possible.217 For these reasons, parties may invoke the 
justification so their agreement will be subject to more relaxed review and 
the sale will be more likely to proceed.  
Research has shown that unsecured creditors and equity holders are 
often placed in a worse position in a § 363(b) sale than they would be in a 
plan confirmation.218 At the same time secured creditors and priority 
creditors are often placed in a superior position, possibly due to their 
involvement in the drafting of the sale agreement and also due to the money 
saved by averting a drawn out bankruptcy.219 Because of the quick timeline, 
                                                                                                                                          
 209. In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d 1063, 1071 (2d Cir. 1983). 
 210. See, e.g., In re Chrysler LLC (Chrysler I), 405 B.R. 84, 96 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(discussing how proponents of the sale made a showing that the sale was necessary for the 
preservation of the estate, that no other purchasers were available even after extensive search and 
that the creditors were receiving a large portion of the distribution just like in a liquidation). 
 211. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(7)(A)(ii) (2006). 
 212. See Chrysler I, 405 B.R. 84 (showing was made that there was an extensive search made 
for purchasers and only Fiat was willing to be involved); In re General Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 
463, 480–81 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (showing was made that there were no other purchasers 
available and willing to acquire the company). 
 213. See, e.g., Chrysler I, 405 B.R. at 480. 
 214. See, e.g., Lionel, 722 F.2d at 1071. 
 215. See Rose, supra note 22, at 270–71 (“[T]he court is reluctant to scrutinize quick 
transactions since a denial would risk irreparable diminished payouts to creditors.”). 
 216. See id. at 271. 
 217. See George W. Kuney, Misinterpreting Bankruptcy Code 363(f) and Undermining the 
Chapter 11 Process, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 235, 279–80 (2002). 
 218. See id. at 275–80 (indicating that secured and priority creditors benefit from expedited 
sales while other creditors are placed at a disadvantage). 
 219. See id. 
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limited access to information, and lack of involvement in the drafting of the 
sale, it is questionable whether impaired parties can meaningfully object in 
a “time is of the essence” § 363(b) sale hearing.220 
The other major problem with a “time is of the essence” sale is that it 
precludes an effective market test.221 Where urgency is present, market 
participants either cannot formulate a bid or their offers will be rejected to 
maintain a current secured offer.222 
“Time is of the essence” sales are appealing for the purchasing party 
because of this limited scrutiny and likely sale.223 However, the sale is 
susceptible to abuse and increases the likelihood of “sweetheart” deals 
accruing unfair benefits to the purchaser and insiders.224 A requirement that 
the proponent of a “time is of the essence” sale show a compelling necessity 
is needed to counteract the lack of a market test and limited ability of 
creditors to object;225 the need for a quick sale should heighten scrutiny not 
diminish it. 
Courts should inquire into the efforts made to sell the company and 
require disclosure of any offers for its purchase. This will be necessary to 
not only analyze whether better offers are available but also what actions 
were taken to sell the company and whether future offers are likely.226 If the 
“drop dead date” is sufficiently far in the future, the market test should 
supplement this showing. To make this showing, the proponent should 
show that the debtor engaged in bidder shopping and establish that despite 
the special privileges of § 363(b), a new purchaser would not come forward. 
Review of the reason for the impending deadline, while not 
dispositively establishing the credibility of the threat, may reveal an attempt 
to subvert the system.227 If a “drop dead date” does not relate to a valid 
business reason, the court should engage in or strengthen the substantive 
review of the sale. 
                                                                                                                                          
 220. See Rose, supra note 22, at 260. 
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2010] 363(b) Sales: Market Test Procedures & Heightened Scrutiny 269 
2. INDEPENDENT COURT REVIEW FOR FRAUD AND 
SELF-DEALING 
In “time is of the essence” § 363(b) sales, review by creditors is limited, 
full disclosure is ineffective or impossible, and a market test is effectively 
avoided.228 As such, procedural impediments to abuse are rendered 
ineffective. In order to instill credibility and deter abuse, the sale agreement 
must be subject to review by the courts; this provides a reasonable, though 
imperfect, substitute for a market test.229 
The court or the United States trustee should independently review 
“time is of the essence” sales to ensure against fraud. Finding that the terms 
are fair and not the product of abuse will prevent insiders selling to the 
purchaser for below market value in return for side benefits.230 The mere 
fact of the review may also deter parties from engaging in side dealing or 
“sweetheart deals” because the court will be aware of and look for such 
favorable terms. 
First, in much the same way that disclosure requirements in areas such 
as securities law deter fraud and self-dealing, court review should deter 
proponents of § 363(b) sales from engaging in abuse.231 This “substantive 
fairness”232 review will not likely affect results that are at the margin of 
reasonable purchases, but it may reveal abuse in egregious cases. 
Second, the substantive review may provide insight into the bidding 
process and increase the likelihood that another purchaser will come 
forward.233 This information can be evaluated along with the record 
provided by the § 363(b) proceedings to supplement an analysis of the 
sale’s necessity. If a plan seems “too good to be true,” the court may require 
the sale to be pushed back and a market test ordered. 
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While such review cannot replace a market test, this heightened 
scrutiny will facilitate the bankruptcy judge’s power in such emergency 
situations to prevent or at least limit abuse. 
CONCLUSION 
The Chrysler and General Motors cases indicate that the use of § 
363(b) sales is important and relevant.234 The impact of these sales will be 
felt widely in bankruptcy proceedings, out-of-court workouts, and in 
corporate meetings throughout America.235 
Commercial transactions operate in the “shadow of the law”236 and 
remains unclear what impact the automotive bankruptcies will have on 
commercial decisions in the future. However, lenders—such as those that 
were negatively impacted by the two companies filing for bankruptcy and 
resorting to § 363(b) sales—are vital to a thriving economy;237 they take 
into account the risks associated with businesses filing for bankruptcy and 
allocate future capital accordingly.238 Even assuming that creditors in the 
General Motors and Chrysler cases were provided with as large of a payout 
as they would have received in a plan confirmation, their loss of control 
over the process may have had a negative impact on lenders generally and 
may chill lending to distressed or even healthy businesses.239 This, coupled 
with concerns over abuse, fraud, and self-dealing, provides a compelling 
reason to safeguard creditors and curtail the use of § 363(b) sales.240 
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On the other hand, § 363(b) sales provide undeniable benefits to 
struggling businesses and their stakeholders.241 A solution that combines 
these benefits—such as speed and efficiency—with the plan confirmation’s 
democratic protections can improve the system by protecting creditors 
without limiting the bankruptcy judge’s discretion.242 Providing a 
meaningful robust market test will contribute such improvement. The 
market test helps to ensure that the price paid for the business is fair, that 
there is no inside dealing, and that creditors are benefited by the sale.243 If a 
market test is impractical because “time is of the essence,” heightened 
scrutiny of the sale will safeguard against the same factors and work to 
prevent the abuse of creditors.244 
While this proposal is not presented as a panacea for the bankruptcy 
system, or even for all of the problems associated with § 363(b) sales, it 
intends to demonstrate that the debate between proponents of Chapter 11 
plan confirmations and those of § 363(b) sales should not be viewed as an 
either/or conflict. Both processes have a great deal to offer a distressed 
business and its creditors; both also have significant drawbacks, not only to 
the debtor and creditors, but to the system.245 By crafting a solution that 
attempts to take advantage of the best aspects from each, the parties, the 
system, and the community at large all benefit. 
However, such a solution raises problems and questions of its own. 
How does a court determine whether the period for the market test is 
adequate? When proposed sales differ by terms other than price, who 
decides which plan is superior and what criterion are used? Under what 
circumstances should a market test be found to be cost prohibitive? Further 
inquiry is also necessary to assess whether the tradeoffs of disclosure—
including deterring possible purchasers—will be outweighed by the benefits 
of deterring abuse and having parties analyze the transaction. Nor is a 
judge’s inquiry into the risk of, or fear of denying a “time is of the essence” 
sale, alleviated. Further, such a proposal will not prevent parties from 
                                                                                                                                          
Fraudulent § 363 preplan business sales undermine the principles and policies that 
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attempting to “game the system”246 by creating innovative solutions to 
benefit themselves at the expense of others. 
Even if a perfect solution is unattainable, the project is still a worthy 
one. Improving the bankruptcy system and what it stands for, as attorneys, 
academics, Congress, and the courts have been doing for two centuries, is 
reason enough to continue to search for solutions for new problems as they 
arise. Perhaps by improving the system, perfection may be achieved, for in 
the words of Sir Winston Churchill, “[t]o improve is to change; to be 
perfect is to change often.”247 
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